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I;J THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SEC URI TY BANK OF UTAH, N. A. , ) 
a corporation, ) 
Respondent, 
-vs-
COLONIAL FORD' me. , 
Defendant, 
and 
LEGRANDE L. BELNAP and 
DORIS BELNAP, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
15745 
------
The District Court erred when it denied defendants' Motion 
to amend their Answer to include allegations of contractual mistake 
and misunderstanding as a defense to plaintiff's Complaint. 
The District Court abused its discretion when it denied 
defendants' Motion to amend their Answer to include allegations of 
contractual mistake and misunderstanding of the parties as a defense 
to plaintiff's Complaint. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the contractual responsibility of two 
individual defendants for a corporate debt which they allegedly 
assumed by written guarantee at the time the corporate obligation 
was incurred. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case came to trial on the issue of whether the written 
t;u.ffa.ntee signed by the defendants was induced by the fraud of bank 
representatives. At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendants 
mane a Motion for leave to amend their Answer to conform to the 
evidence by adding an affirmative defense of mistake and misunderstar' 
ing of the parties as a defense to plaintiff's Complaint. The court 
denied the Motion and entered judgment against the defendants in the' 
sum oI $33, 236. 80, plus interest, attorney's fees and court costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek on this appeal to have the judgment vacateil 
and set aside and to have the Supreme Court order that a new trial b1 
held to determine if the written guarantee executed by the defendant;: 
should be rescinded because of the mistake and misunderstanding of 
the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed this action in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County against the defendant, Colonial Ford, Inc., to recover 
sums due under a promissory note executed by the corporation on 
September 14, 1976. In a second cause of action, the plaintiffsought 
to recover a similar amount from defendants, LeGrande L. Belnap and I 
Doris Belnap, on the basis of a written guarantee which they executea 
with the corporate note. 
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Judgment by Default was entered against the corporation 
on December 14, 1976, but the individual defendants filed an Answer 
alleging that the written guarantee was obtained through the fraud 
of corporate agents. (R.12-13) The question of the personal 
liability of the Belnaps was tried by the court, sitting without a 
jury, on February 2, 1978. At the conclusion of the evidence, the 
defendants moved to amend their Answer to conform to the evidence 
by including an affirmative defense to the effect that the written 
guarantee was based on the mistake and misunderstanding of the parties. 
(R.249) That Motion was denied. (R.249) The court then found the 
issues in favor of the plaintiff bank and entered judgment against 
the defendants for the amount owed by the corporation under the 
promissory note. (R.120) 
Although the testimony of defendants' witnesses at the trial 
was first designed to prove fraud on t'."1e part of the bank's agent in 
obtaining the signatures of the defendants on the guarantee, it also 
appeared from the evidence that the execution of the guarantee was 
based on the reasonable but mistaken belief of the defendants that 
they were signing something else. 
Ronald Folkerson was the branch manager at the Sugarhouse 
office of First Security Bank in September, 1976. (R.209) He became 
concerned about a sizeable overdraft in the checking account of 
Colonial Ford, Inc. (R.209) He called defendant Doris Belnap on the 
telephone to discuss the overdraft. (R.209) He asked her to sign 
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a note and to guarantee the overdraft. (R. 172) She refused because 
it was a corporate obligation and because her husband and attorney 
were both out of town at that time. (R. 172-3) He then asked her to 
have the attorney get in touch with him when he returned. (R.173) 
Mrs. Belnap later told her attorney about the conversation 
with Folkerson and asked him to handle it for her. (R. 173) The 
attorney met with Mr. Folkerson at the bank office a few days later. 
(R. 158-9) Folkerson suggested that Colonial Ford sign a promissory 
note to cover the overdraft, and the attorney agreed to have t~ 
officers of Colonial Ford sign such a note. (R.160) Mr. Folkerson 
also requested that Mr. and Mrs. Belnap execute the note as co-signc1 
The attorney refused to do that. (R.120, 216) As an alternative, 
Folkerson suggested that the Belnaps sign a guarantee for the note. 
The attorney again refused because the form used by the bank is un· 
conditional and guarantees anything and everything. (R. 160-1) 
The attorney also objected to having the Belnaps sign an outright 
guarantee for payment of the overdraft because it was not their 
obligation. (R.169) However, Belnaps' attorney suggested that 
if Folkerson would have the bank's attorney contact him, he wo0d 
recommend to the Belnaps that they sign a "guarantee of collection." 
(R.161) The content of such a guarantee was to be worked out 
between the attorneys. (R. 161) Neither of the Belnaps were present 
at the meeting held at the bank. (R.165) 
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On September 14, 1976, Mr. Folkerson called the Colonial 
Ford Company and spoke with Mrs. Belnap. (R.174) He insisted that 
he come to the dealership that day and get the overdraft covered by a 
note. He stated that he had to have a corporation note because the 
audicors were at the bank and the overdraft was causing him some 
problems. (R. 175) 
Mrs. Belnap told him that she would consult with her attorney 
and then call him back. When she called the attorney's office, he 
was unavailable. (R.176) She returned the call to Mr. Folkerson and 
told him that she couldn't meet with him that day because the attorney 
was unavailable. Mr. Folkerson told her that he knew the attorney 
couldn't be there, but he said he had to have the note. He told her 
that he had prepared the papers in accordance with her attorney's instruc· 
tions, and he insisted on completing the transaction that day. (R.176) 
Folkerson said nothing about the personal guarantees in that 
telephone conversation. He merely stated that he had the papers and 
he would bring them down to the dealership. (R.176-7) After some 
discussion, Mrs. Belnap consented that Mr. Folkerson could come to 
the agency with the papers later that same afternoon. (R.177) When 
he arrived at the agency, Mrs. Belnap called her attorney on the 
telephone and told him that Mr. Folker son was there with the papers 
in his hand. (R.177) The attorney was unable to meet with them, and 
he had no idea what was in the documents. (R.163) However, the 
attorney told Mrs. Belnap that if Folkerson would represent to them 
that he had prepared the papers in accordance with his discussion 
with her attorney, then he would recommend that they sign those papers. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(R. 1;7) She advised her husband of the attorney's statement, a~ 
her husband turned to Mr. Folkerson and k d h" "f as e im i these were the 
papers that Mr. Rothey had instructed him to prepare. Folkersoo 
answered in the affirmative and said that th h d b ey a een prepared as : 
instructed by their attorney. (R.177-8) 
In a previous phone call, Mr. Folkerson had told Mrs. Beln; 
that he knew that her attorney wouldn't let her or her husband guararJ 
the note because it was a corporate obligation and was not her persor 
obligation. Because of this, Mrs. Belnap was not concerned aboot~ 
ing a personal guarantee. (R.177) 
Based on the representation made by Mr. Folkerson regardin: 
the preparation of the papers, Mr. and Mrs. Belnap signed the papers. 
(R. 178) At that time, the Belnaps thought they were signing a docume: 
that had been negotiated by their corporate and personal attorney~ 
had been prepared in accordance with his instructions. (R.180) The), 
didn't read the document because Mr. Folkerson told them that it had 
been prepared in accordance with their attorney's instructions. (R.fr' 
Mrs. Belnap would not have signed the document without the Folkerson' 
representation. (R.181, 191) She never intended to sign a personal 
guarantee of a corporate obligation. (R.184) 
Mr. Belnap also relied upon the Folker son representation. 
Except for Mr. Folkerson' s assurance that the papers had been agreed 
1 
upon by his attorney, Mr. Belnap never would have signed those papen 
on that date or at any other time. (R.197) He never read the d~~ 
d 1 1 h · d b Folkerson. (R.l
9; and he relie so e y upn t e representation ma e y 
h d · d the papers· (R.ir He was not aware that his attorney a not examine Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND 
THEIR ANSWER TO INCLUDE ALLEGATIONS 
OF CONTRACTUAL MISTAKE AND MISUNDER-
STANDI:~G AS A DEFENSE TO PL\INTIFF' S 
COMPL\INT 
Rule lS(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, deals with 
amendments to conform to the evidence and reads as follows: 
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment 
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them 
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even 
after judgment; but failure to so amend does not 
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If 
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, 
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or 
defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a 
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting 
party to meet such evidence." 
In construing and applying this rule, the Supreme Court has 
held that it has two separate parts. The first part is applicable 
when issues not raised in the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, and the second part is applicable 
where a motion to amend is made in response to an objection by the 
opposing party to the introduction of evidence. In the first case 
the court has no discretion and it must allow the amendment. Only 
in the second case may the court determine whether prejudice, undue Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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delay or laches ought to prevent the amendment. See General 
Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dvnasty Corp., 545 P2dy 
In the cited case, the trial court had denied defendant's 
motion to amend his answer to include lack of consideration as an 
affirmative defense. The motion was made to conform defendant's 
pleadings to the evidence after witnesses had testified that the 
indemnity agreement relied upon by the pla.intiff had been obtainea 
from defendant as an afterthought long after the original bondi~ 
agreement had been signed by the primary obligor. Because the 
evidence on which the motion was based was introduced without 
objection from the plaintiff, the court ruled that the issue was 
tried by implied consent. Relying on its construction of Rule lS(t 
:ceferred to above, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's 
refusal to allow the proposed amendment was error and sent the case, 
back for a new trial. The court reasoned that Rule 15 (b) mandatea 
the trial court to grant the motion under the circumstances of that 
case. 
In the action now before the court, similar circumstances 
were before the trial court when a similar motion was .denied. Witr. 
out objection from the plaintiff, the defendants testified that whi:, 
they executed their personal guarantee of a corporate obligatioo, 
they mistakenly believed that they were signing something else. ~ 
facts brought out at the trial strongly support their assertions in, 
this regard. 
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When the Branch Manager at plaintiff's Sugarhouse Office 
contacted Mrs. Belnap about a sizeable overdraft in the checking 
account of Colonial Ford, Inc., she refused to sign a note to guaran-
tee the corporate obligation. Then she turned the matter over to her 
attorney for a final determination. When the attorney met with bank 
representatives, he agreed that the corporation would sign a note to 
cover the overdraft, but he expressly refused to have Mr. and Mrs. 
Belnap execute the note as co-signers. Hhen bank personnel suggested 
as an alternative that the Belnaps sign a guarantee, the attorney 
again refused because the form used by the bank is unconditional in 
nature. The attorney also objected to the guarantee for payment 
because the obligation was that of the corporation. 
The testimony also revealed that defendants' attorney would 
recommend that they sign some kind of a guarantee if a satisfactory 
document could be worked out between the attorneys. Neither of the 
Belnaps were present at the meeting held at the bank, and they left 
the details to their own attorney. 
Without any consultation between the attorneys, plaintiff's 
representative called the Colonial Ford Company and insisted that the 
overdraft be covered by a note. Defendants' attorney could not meet 
with them on that date, but he advised Mrs. Belnap that if the bank 
representative would represent to them that the papers to be signed 
had been prepared in accordance with their attorney's instructions, 
then they should go ahead and sign them. The bank representative 
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~ade that representation, and the documents •,·.•ere d execute without 
being read by the defendants. The attorney also had no knowledge,: 
their contents. At that time, the Belnaps thought they · were s1gni: 
a document that bad been negotiated by their corporate and personai 
I 
attorney and had been prepared in accordance with his instructions 
They never intended to sign a personal guarantee of a corporate~ 
gation. They thought they were signing a document, which, in fact.
1 
was non-existent. 
The evidence clearly showed that the defendants were mistit 
when they signed the document upon which their liability was based: 
the conclusion of the evidence, their counsel moved to amend their 
Answer to conform to that evidence. That motion was abruptly deniu 
the court. That ruling was in error because under Rule lS(b) theh 
of mistake of the parties had already been tried by implied consent' 
Under the interpretation of the Rule made by the court in General 
Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp. , Supra., t"·' 
granting of the motion was mandatory. Denial of the motion was err:• 
eous, and the case should be remanded to the court for a new tti~ 
In support of the trial court's ruling on defendants' m~k 
to amend, plaintiff will undoubtedly argue that Rule 8 (c), Utah Ruli' 
of Civil Procedure, requires that affirmative defenses be ple~~· 
that failure to do so is fatal to any such defense. The Supreme(i; 
· Ch Rucker, 14 U2d 205, 381 PZd 111 faced this same argument in eney v. 
(1963), where the court stated that the rules must be considered in, 
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the light of their purpose of liberalizing both pleading and pro-
cedure when resolving any discrepancy in their content. The language 
of the court in the Cheney case, all of which appears to be applicable 
to the matter now before the court, reads as follows: 
"Plaintiff also raises the procedural point 
that since defendants did not plead the subsequent 
agreement as an affirmative defense, they should 
not have been permitted to rely thereon. It is true, 
as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), U. R. C. P., 
requires that affirmative defenses be pleaded. It 
is a good rule whose purpose is to have the issues 
to be tried clearly framed. But it is not the only 
rule in the book of Rules of Civil Procedure. They 
must all be looked to in the light of their even more 
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and 
procedure to the end that the parties are afforded 
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate con-
tentions they have pertaining to their dispute. 
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this 
is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our 
rules provide for liberality to allow examination 
into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the 
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other 
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue 
if he so requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P., so states. 
It further allows for an amendment to conform to the 
proof after trial or even after judgment, and indicates 
that if the ends of justice so require, 'failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues.' This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c)(l), 
U.R.C.P.: '[E]very final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings.' 
Although the plaintiff did object to evidence on 
the issue of subsequent agreement, when it was over-
ruled, he made no request for a continuance nor did he 
make any representation to the court that h7 was t~ken 
by surprise or otherwise at a disadvant~ge in meeting_ 
that issue. The trial court not only did not abuse his 
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discretion in allowing the issue to be raised and 
receivi~f the contr~ct in evidence, but he would 
have fai ed the lain mandate of ·ustice had he 
refused to do so. Emphasis applie 
POINT NO. II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND 
THEIR ANSWER TO INCLUDE ALLEGATIONS OF co:;-
TRACTUAL MISTAKE AND MISUNDERSTANDING OF 
THE PARTIES AS A DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT 
If the court should determine in its deliberations that• 
question of whether defendants should be allowed to amend their Am; 
to conform to the proof was a matter within the discretion of the 
court, then defendants further assert that such discretion was abus: 
in this instance. 
As noted above, the second part of Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, is applicable where a motion to amend is made r 
response to an objection by the opposing party to the introduction' 
evidence. Although such an objection was not forthcoming in thisc' 
the cases cited under this rule show that any discretion of the c:I 
allowed in determining motions to conform to the evidence should be 
exercised liberally and in the interest of justice. See Cheney.2:_ 
Rucker, Supra.; General Insurance Company of America v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., Supra.; and Morris v. Russell, 120 U 545, 236P2d4i 
Rule 54(c) (1) requires that every final judgment shall gr' 
·I 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entli 
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even if the party has not demanded such relief in its pleadings. The 
Supreme Court declared in Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 U2d 297, 
452 P2d 325, that this rule indicates that there shall be liberality 
of procedure to reach the result which justice requires. 
The Supreme Court has shown this liberality in construing the 
rule as it concerns amendments to the pleadings during the trial. In 
Buehner Blnck Company v. Glezos, 6 U2d 226, 310 P2d 517, the court 
allowed an unpleaded partnership issue to be determined at trial where 
it was not objected to by the defendant and both sides went into the 
facts of the partnership during the testimony at the trial. 
The court ruled in Cheney v. Rucker, Supra., that the trial 
court properly allowed the pleadings to be amended and an affirmative 
defense to be included as an issue where the opposing party made no 
request for a continuance and made no representation to the court that 
he was taken by surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage in meeting the 
issue. cou-:::t also noted that dlthough Rule 8(c) requires that 
affirmative defenses be pleaded, that rule must be ruled in the light 
of the fundamental purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure of liberal-
izing the requirements of pleading and procedure so that parties can 
properly present their legitimate contentions in one proceeding. 
The Supreme Court noted in General Insurance Company of 
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., Supra., that the purpose of the 
amendment to conform to the proof is to bring the pleadings in line 
with the actual issues upon which the case was tried. 
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Keeping in mind the liberality of the court in these mat 
we turn to the issues of this case. The defendants are alleging tL 
the >;uarantee that they signed should be rescinded because of thei: 
c,nilateral mistake. They had not seen the papers prior to the tiii 
of signature. They didn't read them at that time because they uL 
upon Mr. Folker son's representation to them that the papers had ber 
prepared in accordance with the instructions of their own attorney 
Thev believed that they were signing something that was non-exister 
at that time. Both the defendants and their attorney had advisedt 
bank that they would not sign a promissory note or give an unlimit<. 
guarantee to the bank. They had no intention to do so when the dor 
ment was signed. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has had prior occasion to deal 
with the contractual defense of unilateral mistake. In Ashw~ 
Charlesworth, 119 U 650, 231 P2d 724, the court stated the general 
rule in such matters by quoting from an annotation in 59 ALR 809 as 
follows: 
"Equitable relief from a mutual mistake is 
frequently given by a reformation of the contract. 
But a contract will not be reformed for a unilateral 
mistake. Equitable relief may, however, be given 
from a unilateral mistake by a rescission of the 
contract. Essential conditions to such relief are 
(1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence 
that to enforce the contract as actually made would 
be unconscionable. (2) The matter as to which the 
mistake was made must relate to a material feature 
of the contract. (3) Generally the mistake must have 
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary 
diligence by the party making the mistake. (4~ I~ 
must be possible to give relief by way of rescission 
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without serious prejudice to the other party 
except the loss of his bargain. In other words, 
it must be possible to put him in statu quo." 
The above language was adopted as the law of Utah in the 
cited case and has been subsequently quoted and followed in the case 
of Davis v. Mulholland, 25 U2d 56, 475 P2d 835. 
When applying the facts of this case to the standards set 
forth above, we find that the defense of unilateral mistake would 
clearly be applicable to the Belnap circumstances. The first condi-
tion listed above is that the mistake must be so grave a consequence 
that to enforce the contract as actually made would be unconscion-
able. The amount involved in this action exceeds $40,000.00. If the 
Belnaps were required to pay this amount from their personal funds 
and assets, it would be a great burden to them. On the other hand, 
the plaintiff can still look to the corporation for satisfaction of 
its prior judgment for the overdraft amount. As was stated on several 
occasions during the trial of the case, the overdraft obligation was 
that of the corporation and not that of its individual stockholders. 
The purpose of organizing the corporation in the first place was to 
insulate the stockholders from personal liability. It was also 
pointed out during the trial that the overdraft came from corporate 
activities and not from any personal loans or transactions made by 
its officers or these defendants. The note was given to cover a 
corporate obligation. It would certainly be unconscionable to 
require the Belnaps to pay this amount unless they knowingly accepted 
that obligation. 
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The second condition stated above requires that the mist; 
must relate to a material feature of the contract. Th e materialit; 
the guarantee is self-evident here and need not be discussed at~ 
great length. 
The third requirement is th.Jt the mis take must have occurr 
despite the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the Belnaps. i 
is the only requirement that might give the court trouble in~~~ 
It is conceded that the Belnaps did not read the guarantee befu~f 
signed it. However, they were relying upon the representation oft 
bank representative to the effect that the document had been prepar' 
in accordance with the instructions of their attorney. They were~ 
even aware of what those instructions were, and reading the contract. 
wouldn't have given them great enlightenment in this regard. They 
were following the advice of their own counsel and relying upon the 
representations of the bank manager when they signed the document. 
It certainly isn't negligence to rely upon the advice of your own 
counsel and to accept the word of an important officer of the bank. 
Mrs. Belnap had expressly refused to sign a blanket guarantee or 
even co-sign on the promissory note. She had no reason to believe 
that the bank officer would present papers that achieved the very • 
thing she had refused to do in the first place. 
The fourth requirement of unilateral mistake is that the 
court can give relief by way of rescission without serious prejudice 
to the other party except the loss of his bargain. In this instance 
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it should be remembered that the bank has a judgment by default 
against the corporation. This judgment is fully effective and 
~ollectable by normal means. The corporation owns a large piece of 
property that is to some degree subject to the corporate obligations. 
The plaintiff's interests would not be seriously prejudiced by a 
judgment for the defendants on the question of personal liability. 
In refusing to grant the Motion to amend to conform to the 
evidence, the court abused its discretionand denied the defendants 
their normal rights under the procedures of the court. A reversal 
of the trial court's decision is mandatory in this instance. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth above, the court should reverse the 
trial court's decision and remand the matter for further proceedings 
and for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
!ef~~~ 
Attorney for Appellants 
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NOTICE OF MAILING 
Mailed two copies of this Erief to Respondent's attom~ 
Steven H. Gunn, 400 Deseret Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, 
7 //-b:' l:nited States Mail, postage prepaid, this - day of Septemb 
1978. 
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